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The Origin of North Korean Economic Institutions 
  Like China, the DPRK owes its political and economic structure to the command 
economy of the Soviet Union—a structure that provides political control at the expense 
of poor economic performance.  This system is built on state ownership of industry and 
land, collectivized agriculture, the centralized coordination of economic activities by a 
hierarchical bureaucracy taking its direction from a Communist Party, the absence of true 
market prices, and the lack of legal alternatives to the centrally-determined administrative 
plans.  The chief goal of the planners is maximum economic growth, but the poor 
information and incentive features of administrative planning foster protectionism and 
autarky, impede productivity and innovation, and yield disappointing results for 
consumer well being.   
A large Western literature explores the economic consequences of the Soviet 
command system.  Centralization of management in a state bureaucracy yielded 
monopoly outcomes, with rent-seeking, privilege, and biased information, writes Joseph 
Stiglitz.  Monopoly control eliminated competitive access to alternatives.  Missing 
markets impeded the shift of resources from low-value to high-value use, and lack of 
property rights distorted incentives and hindered innovation (Stiglitz, 1995). 
However, the Chinese socialist system differed from the Soviet system in its 
resource endowment and its economic organization.  China was poor.  Agriculture was 
the primary economic activity.  In agriculture, labor was under-employed for much of the 
year and vulnerable to shocks in output. Before 1978, the consequence of the 
government’s emphasis on industrial investment and a “grain first” policy in agriculture 
  2blocked the mechanization of farming and adjustment of cropping to local conditions.  It 
resulted in slow growth of output for all crops.  
 In industry, too, central planning was ill-suited to Chinese circumstances.  
Industrial plants in China were smaller and widely dispersed.  Large plants coexisted with 
shops and small collectives.  Physical infrastructure and transport were weak.  There was 
little capacity to move commodities between provinces. 
China made central planning work by decentralizing.  Decentralization of the 
Chinese fiscal system accompanied decentralized planning.  Provincial and sub-
provincial governments controlled depreciation allowances and profits of small-scale 
enterprises, which they used for regional investment.  Thus, regional governments had 
mechanisms for influencing the direction of local production and incentives to use 
resources for growth (Wong, 1985).   
Chinese economic performance in the pre-reform era was shaken by political 
conflicts at the center, compounded by the poor information and incentive problems of 
planning.  In 1959, China’s “Great Leap Forward” ended in famine and catastrophe.  
Again, the Cultural Revolution, beginning in 1966 inaugurated a decade of chaos and 
succession struggle, ending with the death of Mao.  The willingness of China’s leaders to 
support market-oriented reforms reflects, in part, the emergence of pragmatic decision-
makers under the influence of Deng Xiaoping who recognized that economic failure 
challenged their political legitimacy (Naughton, 62.) 
 
North Korea Today 
  The Soviet model fits the DPRK more easily than it ever fit China.  North Korea 
is small and industrialized.  Its industry is centralized and its bureaucracies tightly 
controlled.  However, the unraveling of Gorbachev’s Soviet Union should serve as a 
warning that seemingly-strong command systems that are built on coercion are brittle and 
can come unglued under the pressure of economic imbalances.  Thus, North Korea today 
appears to be an unraveling command system.  It shares more features with China in 1978 
or the former Soviet Union in 1985 than with any reforming economy.   Its Stalinist 
heritage persists in spite of the emergence in the DPRK of a legal farmers’ market, 
informal markets for consumer goods, and widespread household reliance on outside 
  3hard-currencies for transacting and saving.   Under the guiding hand of the Dear Leader, 
the government retains state ownership of industrial capacity and land.  Agriculture 
remains collectivized, and hierarchical bureaucracies choose priority government targets, 
coordinating their fulfillment administratively.    
  Seen from outside, based on fragmentary information, the priority economic 
activities of the government are determined by administrative coordination.  Production 
and export targets are set centrally.   Input deliveries, determined from an input-output 
balance, are coordinated administratively.  State industrial employment and the main 
components of household consumption in the state sector are determined 
bureaucratically.  In the state sector, nominal prices and wages play a minor role in 
household consumption.  As was true in the former Soviet Union, the military sector and 
military-industrial complex appear to function as a separate, privileged hierarchy.  
William Brown reports in a workshop at Stanford University that the DPRK military and 
security establishment manages its own industrial investment and export enterprises, 
accumulating its hard-currency revenues separately from the government budget (Brown, 
2006).  Nevertheless, the consumption of the North Korean draftee during his required 
six years of service is reported to be low.  Eberstadt estimates this military employment at 
roughly 1.2 million persons (Eberstadt, 2005). 
  A rising share of household purchases of food and consumer goods in informal 
markets at market-determined prices raises the question of whether a legal, market-
oriented consumer sector is emerging.  The answer depends on whether there is a legal, 
decentralized population of non-state producers, not merely black-market traders.  
Flexible supply responses and structural change in variety and availability of consumer 
goods would be a promising indicator.  Are peasants producing and selling a greater 
variety of products?  Are they able to sell their products directly outside of official 
channels?  Can peasants invest in small-scale structures and acquire fodder and feed to 
engage in animal husbandry?  Can they purchase equipment to re-establish traditional 
activities, such as soybeans and apiaries?   
Alternatively, the appearance of market-based trade may simply signal the ability 
of decision-makers within the state apparatus to convert their access to rationed goods at 
low prices into hard-currency, black-market revenues.  Transfers of rice, oil, and 
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privileged circles access to commodities that are otherwise unavailable, but, unless the 
state, itself, undertakes a genuine liberalization of its policies toward decentralized 
producers, the emergence of black markets will not create incentives for market 
liberalization.  Instead, insider officials, illegal traders, and corruptible regulators all will 
have incentives to retain administrative allocation and their opportunities for arbitrage.  
A much more worrisome indicator for the planners is the indirect evidence that 
the DPRK is moving toward hyperinflation.  I have been unable to find the requisite 
information on the size of the fiscal deficit or growth of money supply and credit.   
However, a steady increase in the market prices of food and a steady drop in the 
won/dollar ratio suggests that the DPRK is experiencing, not just a one-time adjustment 
from controlled to market prices, but a destabilizing approach to hyperinflation. 
 
Recent Data on the North Korean Economy
1
  A brief review of the fragmentary data on North Korean production provides little 
evidence of Chinese-style liberalization.  In 1979, when China liberalized its agricultural 
markets and allowed households to engage in decentralized production again, there were 
immediate output responses.  However, a look at DPRK statistics gives little cause for 
optimism.  Data from the IMF International Financial Statistics and (smoothed) data from 
Angus Maddison documents South Korea’s growth and North Korea’s continued 
stagnation (Table 1).  Recent estimates by the Bank of Korea show a modest recovery in 
North Korean production after the recent influx of assistance (Table 2).  Yet, aside from a 
modest recovery in output of minerals and in production of soybeans and vegetables, 
output of major products is stagnant (rice) or declining (fish products and steel).  
Electricity output, too, appears to be unchanging (Tables 3 and 4).  If there is greater 
activity in the informal economy, it is not yet reflected in greater availability of goods. 
Thus, the rise in national income appears to originate in the substantial, aid-
funded import surpluses that the DPRK has enjoyed in recent years, notably with South 
Korea and China (Table 5).   Since the drastic decline in trade with the former Soviet 
                                                 
1 I am grateful to Stephanie Price for collection of data from the Bank of Korea and construction of the 
accompanying charts. 
  5Union in 1990, these two countries account for roughly 60 percent of North Korea’s 
reported imports and almost half of exports (Table 6, 7, 8).  China, alone, is the major 
supplier of consumer goods, with border trade between DPRK and Northeast China 
accounting for one-third to one-half of these deliveries (Li, 2005).  
Human development indicators suggest that humanitarian assistance has played a 
vital role in protecting vulnerable populations from the dire side effects of imprudent 
policies.  Although the World Bank reports that one-third of North Korea’s citizens suffer 
from malnutrition, UN statistics show high rates of immunization for measles and DPT. 
With foreign assistance providing a major source of potential budget revenue for 
the North Korea government, we would expect to observe a rise in the value of North 
Korean budget expenditure.  However, Bank of Korea data provide no evidence of such 
an increase.  As South Korean budget expenditures surge, North Korean expenditures 
remain lower than a decade ago (Table 9). Official statistics for the 1990s attribute two- 
thirds of that budget expenditure to the category “national economy” and twenty percent 
to social-cultural spending, implying that most of North Korea’s large military 
expenditure is off-budget (Table 10).  It appears that government distribution of foreign 
aid occurs outside of the formal budget accounts as well. 
Clearly, estimates of North Korean economic activity are dependent on the choice 
of currency and price deflators used.  The extraordinary drop in the official won/dollar 
ratio after 2002 might indicate a one-time shift of DPRK financial accounting from a 
notional to a more realistic level, recognizing that repressed inflation is more 
destabilizing than open inflation (Table 11).  However, the reports of a steady rise in 
market prices for food, noted by William B. Brown and cited in Table 12, suggests that 
the Central Bank has the credit window wide open—a policy that can lead to 
hyperinflation in short order (Brown, 2006).   
In sum, I read the fragmentary evidence so far, not as a sign of Chinese-style 
reform, but rather as an indication of official surrender to inflationary pressures in 
informal black markets.  “Dollarization” of North Korean transactions has probably saved 
the domestic economy from greater disruption than it is now facing.  (Are the dollars 
genuine or locally produced?)  
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  There are as many variants of market-supporting reform as there are countries.  
Since North Korea’s agricultural sector is smaller and offers less potential for 
productivity increase than did China’s communes, a shift of agriculture to household 
cropping, alone, will not ignite economic growth.  With a large, well-educated, under-
employed pool of labor, notably in the military, future growth in North Korea will require 
a complementary mix of investment, modern technologies, and market know-how.  Such 
an infusion is likely only if the DPRK leadership embarks on a new, growth-oriented 
course.  Such a course would involve active participation in international organizations, 
an opening of the economy to the international market for both trade and foreign direct 
investment, and improvement of the existing institutional infrastructure for business.  In 
short, it would require a miracle! 
  It is easy to see lessons, both positive and negative, for North Korea in Chinese-
style economic reform, (Thornton-Parker, 2007). 
•  China succeeded in retaining macroeconomic balance in the face of rapid 
structural change.  It kept inflationary pressures under control. 
•  In agriculture, liberalization of markets, disbanding of collective production, and 
de facto long-term tenancy rights to land led to rising agricultural productivity and 
increasing well being.  However, Chinese peasants still do not hold legal title to 
their land. 
•  A rapid increase in the share of small and medium-sized non-state firms 
introduced competition into both product and labor markets, reducing the 
monopoly profits of large-scale producers and forcing SOEs to improve their 
performance as well.  
•  Over a period of 25 years, China accomplished an extraordinary structural change 
from agriculture to industry and from public to private employment.   
•  China’s public sector was highly decentralized, measured on two dimensions—
the decentralization of public-service administration and the effective separation 
of the public sector from the producing sector, as signaled by the replacement of 
administrative direction with market coordination.  
  7•  Government budget expenditures in China were consistently lower than in other 
transition economies, whether one focuses on the consolidated central and sub-
national accounts or on the federal level alone.  In regression estimates, central 
government investment is negatively associated with subsequent regional growth. 
•  China has increased the role of market mechanisms relative to administrative 
mechanisms and subsidies in government policy, although it still depends on 
large-scale firms to provide implicit social services and to maintain excess 
employment. 
•  China is gradually reducing the share of unproductive, policy lending, which 
subsidizes loss-making state-owned firms. 
•  Foreign investment and know-how have played a crucial role in China’s growth.  
Multiple centers of foreign-invested business have emerged in China’s coastal 
regions, far from Beijing’s oversight.  These foreign-assisted businesses have 
markedly higher levels of productivity than other domestic firms. 
•  Local governments that were allowed to keep marginal increases in local tax 
revenue had incentives to pursue growth-supporting policies.  These coastal 
regions enjoyed high growth, assisted by foreign investment and openness to the 
international market.  Central government investment, in contrast, was directed to 
relatively capital-intensive state-owned enterprises.  
•  China’s provinces are extremely heterogeneous in their levels of income and 
economic development.  To date, China has not created mechanisms for 
delivering education, health, and social services to many of its low income areas.    
 
Not all of Chinese experience is available to the DPRK.  For example, China’s 
fondness for decentralized experiment would be hard to emulate.  But obvious lessons are 
many:  break up official collective farms and return to peasant cooperatives or family 
farms; legalize small and medium-sized production activities and establish banks to 
intermediate between savers and borrowers;  liberalize markets for consumer goods, 
services, raw materials, and inputs;  provide infrastructure to protect private ownership of 
housing and small-scale business;  commercialize large state-owned enterprises and 
  8impose hard budget constraints on them….and so forth.  The elements of market-





 Macroeconomic Management 
1.  Fiscal policy: creation of a separate, tax-funded budget sector 
2.  Monetary and debt policy: provision of a stable currency 
 
Benchmarking Introduction of Market-Supporting Policies 
1.  Property rights, markets, and free competition 
Liberalization of markets for food, consumer goods, services, raw materials and inputs 
Legal private ownership and investment in housing and assets, beginning with small-
scale enterprises 
2.  Competitive access to the market by new, decentralized producers 
3.   Convertible currency and openness to the world market  
Access to the world market for domestic exporters and importers 
Access to the domestic market for foreign firms and foreign investors 
4.  Financial Sector:   
Creation of institutions supporting intermediation between savings and investment  
Impose hard-budget constraints for borrowers 
 
Benchmarking the Quality of Institutional Infrastructure 
1.  Property Rights and Rule-Based Governance 
Provide a legal and administrative framework defining and enforcing property-rights 
Support commitment to contracts, and transparent, rule-based governance 
2.  Quality of Budgetary and Financial Management 
  Creation of a separate, tax-funded budget sector 
  Provide fiscal balance in a non-inflationary environment  
3.  Quality of Public Administration 
Transparency and accountability in the public sector 
  Eliminate incentives for corruption 
4.  Government ability to provide local public goods 
 Water,  sewerage 
  Protection of public safety 
5.  Government ability to support education, health, and social protection 
 
  In sum, the DPRK remains a small Stalinist survival. Its gradual entrance into the 
modern world will, no doubt, be slow until Kim Jong Il decides to retire to a comfortable 
villa in France to write a weekly column on opera for Le Monde. 
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Table 7 
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Table 12:  Source:  Brown (2006) 
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North Korea Rice Price:  1995-2006
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